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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative eﬀects of
speculative bubbles on capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. A near-rational bubble
component in the model equity price generates excess volatility in response to observed
technology shocks. In simulations, intermittent equity price run-ups coincide with positive
innovations in technology, investment and consumption booms, and faster trend growth,
reminiscent of the U.S. economy during the late 1920s and late 1990s. The welfare cost of
speculative bubbles depends crucially on parameter values. Bubbles can improve welfare
if risk aversion is low and agents underinvest relative to the socially-optimal level. But for
higher levels of risk aversion, the welfare cost of bubbles is large, typically exceeding one
percent of annual consumption.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Overview
The magnitude of short-term movements in stock prices remains a challenge to explain within
a framework of rational, eﬃcient markets. Numerous empirical studies starting with Shiller
(1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) have shown that stock prices appear to exhibit “excess
volatility” when compared to the discounted stream of ex post realized dividends.1 Another
prominent feature of stock price data is the intermittent occurrence of sustained run-ups above
estimates of fundamental value, so-called speculative bubbles, that can be found throughout
history in various countries and asset markets.2 The dramatic rise in U.S. stock prices during
the late 1990s, followed similarly by U.S. house prices during the mid 2000s, are episodes that
have both been described as bubbles. The former episode was accompanied by a boom in
business investment, while the later was accompanied by a boom in residential investment.
Both booms were later followed by falling asset prices and severe retrenchments in the associ-
ated investment series, as agents sought to unwind the excess capital accumulated during the
bubble periods. Coincident booms in stock prices and investment also occurred during the
late 1920’s–a period that shares many characteristics with the late 1990s. In particular, both
periods witnessed major technological innovations that contributed to investor enthusiasm
about a “new era.”3
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative eﬀects of
speculative bubbles on capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. The framework for the
analysis is a real business cycle model with endogenous growth and capital adjustment costs
(an -type model) along the lines of Barlevy (2004).4 A near-rational bubble component in
the model equity price generates excess volatility in response to observed technology shocks. I
also allow for the possibility of an Arrow-Romer type productive externality, such that agents
may underinvest relative to the socially-optimal level. The severity of the underinvestment
1Lansing and LeRoy (2012) provide a recent update on this literature.
2For an overview of historical bubble episodes, see the collection of papers in Hunter, Kaufman, and Pomer-
leano (2003).
3Similarities between the two periods are noted by Shiller (2000), Gordon (2006), and White (2006), as
described further below.
4In support of this class of models, Ramey and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd empirical evidence of a link between
ﬂuctuations and growth. McGrattan (1998) ﬁnds that periods of high investment rates roughly coincide with
periods of high growth, as predicted by -type endogenous growth models
1problem turns out to be important for analyzing the welfare consequences of ﬂuctuations
stemming from either speculative bubbles or business cycles which, in this model, can aﬀect
the economy’s trend growth rate.
Labor supply in the model is inelastic, consistent with the idea that asset prices are deter-
mined in securities markets by agents who remain fully-employed at all times.5 The represen-
tative agent (a capitalist-entrepreneur) must only decide the fraction of available output to be
devoted to investment, with the remaining fraction devoted to consumption. The investment-
consumption ratio pins down the value of the equityp r i c e - d i v i d e n dr a t i o .I nt h ef u l l y - r a t i o n a l
model, the technology response coeﬃcient in the agent’s decision rule is small in magnitude
such that price-dividend ratio is nearly constant for reasonable levels of risk aversion. In
contrast, the price-dividend ratio in long-run U.S. stock market data is volatile and highly
persistent–close to a random walk. The model result obtains because rational agents un-
derstand that technology shocks give rise to both income and substitution eﬀects which work
in opposite directions. The two eﬀects exactly cancel when the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption (the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion) is unity,
representing logarithmic utility. In this case, the technology response coeﬃcient in the rational
agent’s decision rule is zero, such that the resulting price-dividend ratio is constant.
To introduce excess volatility, I decompose the model equity price into a fundamental com-
ponent and a bubble component. I postulate a law of motion for the bubble component that
satisﬁes the associated no-arbitrage condition exactly at the model steady state (when tech-
nology shocks are zero) and approximately satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition away from the
steady state (when technology shocks are non-zero). The law of motion for the bubble com-
ponent is characterized by a single parameter that governs the bubble’s response to observed
technology shocks. I calibrate the technology response parameter to match the volatility of
the price-dividend ratio in long-run U.S. data. But for any value of this parameter, the bubble
law of motion is “near rational” in the sense that there is little opportunity for arbitrage.
Unlike a rational bubble solution, the near-rational law of motion is stationary (but highly
persistent) and allows the equity price to occasionally dip below the fundamental value in
the bubble-free economy. The bubble component in the equity price maps directly into a
bubble component of investment. The bubble-component of investment augments the stock
of physical capital, but the shareholders who supply the investment funds receive no claim
to any extra dividends; their expected return on the additional funds derives solely from the
prospect for price appreciation of their shares. This is reminiscent of late-1990s investors
who purchased shares in numerous initial public oﬀerings of internet technology companies–
ﬁrms whose prospects for future earnings, let alone dividends, were basically nil.6 In a given
5The setup is also consistent with the near-zero elasticity estimates obtained by most empirical studies. For
an overview of the empirical estimates, see Blundell and McCurdy (1999).
6The term “bubble” was coined in England in 1720 following the famous price run-up and crash of shares in
the South Sea Company. The run-up led to widespread public enthusiasm for the stock market and an explosion
2period, the bubble component of investment inﬂuences the stochastic discount factor (via
the consumption decision) and the total resources which are available to pay dividends to
shareholders. Consequently, there is feedback from the bubble component to the fundamental
equity price. In the presence of the bubble, the fundamental component of the equity price
continues to exactly satisfy the agent’s intertemporal consumption Euler equation.
In model simulations, intermittent equity price run-ups coincide with positive innovations
in technology, investment and consumption booms, and faster trend growth, reminiscent of the
U.S. economy during the late 1920s and late 1990s. The model can also generate prolonged
periods where the price-dividend ratio remains in the vicinity of the rational model value. So
long as technology shocks remain small, the bubble component in the equity price remains
close to zero. Due to the nonlinear nature of the model solution, the simulated price-dividend
ratio in the bubble model exhibits non-Gaussian features such as positive skewness and excess
kurtosis. These features are also present in the data.
Interestingly, the bubble component also improves the model’s ability to match the relative
volatilities of consumption growth, investment growth, and output growth. Because of capital
adjustment costs, investment growth in the rational model exhibits about the same volatility
as output growth, whereas investment growth in the data is about three times more volatile
than output growth. Barlevy (2004, p. 983) acknowledges the diﬃculty of generating suﬃcient
investment volatility in a rational model with capital adjustment costs. In the bubble model,
excess volatility of the equity price maps directly into excess volatility of investment, thereby
improving the comparison with investment volatility in the data.
Finally, I examine the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations that can be attributed to either: (i) spec-
ulative bubbles, or (ii) business cycles. Welfare costs are measured by the percentage change
in per-period consumption that makes the agent indiﬀerent between the two economies being
compared. The welfare cost of bubbles depends crucially on parameter values. Bubbles can
improve welfare (relative to the rational model) if risk aversion is low and agents underinvest
relative to the socially-optimal level. But for higher levels of risk aversion, the welfare cost of
bubbles is large, typically exceeding one percent of annual consumption. In dollar terms, one
percent of annual U.S. consumption translates into a yearly cost of around $855 per household
in 2009.
The welfare results are driven by the interaction of several eﬀects. Since the bubble model
directs more resources to investment on average, bubbles can help address the economy’s
underinvestment problem if one exists. But if the private marginal product of capital is equal
to the social marginal product, then the bubble model is characterized by overinvestment
which serves to reduce welfare. The bubble model is also characterized by higher volatility in
investment which leads to ineﬃciency in the production of new capital due to the presence of
of highly-suspect companies attempting to sell shares to investors. As documented by Mackay (1841), one such
venture notoriously advertised itself as “a company for carrying out an undertaking of great advantage, but
nobody to know what it is.”
3convex capital adjustment costs. As a mitigating factor, the bubble model’s excess volatility in
investment serves to lower the volatility of consumption growth relative to the rational model.
Which of these eﬀects dominate depends on parameter values. When risk aversion is low and
the underinvestment problem is severe, bubbles can improve welfare, but the reverse holds
true for higher levels of risk aversion or when underinvestment is less severe.
An important unsettled question in economics is whether policymakers should take delib-
erate steps to prevent or deﬂate asset price bubbles.7 Those who advocate leaning against
bubbles point out that excessive asset prices can distort economic and ﬁnancial decisions, cre-
ating costly misallocations that can take years to dissipate. Others argue that policies intended
to prick a suspected bubble might send the economy into a recession, thereby foregoing the
beneﬁts of the boom that might otherwise continue. While the welfare results presented here
do not settle the policy question, they do show that speculative bubbles can be very costly for
typical parameter settings.
1.2 Related Literature
The term “excess volatility” implies that asset prices move too much to be explained by
changes in dividends or cash ﬂows. The behavioral ﬁnance literature has examined a wide
variety of evidence pertaining to this phenomenon. Controlled experiments on human sub-
jects suggest that people’s decisions are inﬂuenced by various “heuristics,” as documented by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). The “representativeness heuristic” is a form of non-Bayesian
updating whereby subjects tend to overweight recent observations relative to the underlying
laws of probability that govern the stochastic process. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) ﬁnd evi-
dence of overreaction in comparing returns of portfolios comprised of prior winning and losing
stocks. Arbarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) ﬁnd evidence that
security analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to overreact to new information, particularly when
the information is positive in nature. Daniel, et al. (1998) develop a model where investors’
overconﬁdence about the precision of certain types of information causes them to overreact to
that information. In the laboratory asset market of Caginalp et al. (2000), prices appeared to
overreact to fundamentals and to be driven by previous price changes, i.e., momentum.
This paper also relates to a line of research that explores the links between non-fundamental
asset price movements and investment in physical capital. Theoretical research that examines
rational bubbles in overlapping generations models with productive externalities or market
imperfections includes Saint Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson
(1993), Oliver (2000), and Caballero et al. (2006). This paper goes beyond previous work by
exploring the quantitative implications of bubbles in a plausibly-calibrated model.
The capital adjustment cost formulation in the model implies that movements in the equity
price are linked directly to movements in investment, as in a standard Tobin’s  framework.
7For an overview of the various arguments, see Lansing (2008, 2011).
4Along these lines, an empirical study by Barro (1990) ﬁnds that changes in real stock prices
since 1891 have strong explanatory power for the growth rate of business investment. Studies
by Chirinko and Schaller (2001), Gilchrist et al. (2005), and Campello and Graham (2012)
all ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant empirical link between stock price bubbles and investment
decisions by ﬁrms.
Dupor (2005) examines the policy implications of non-fundamental asset price movements
in monetary business cycle model with capital adjustments costs. Non-fundamental asset price
movements are driven by exogenous “expectation shocks” that a drive a wedge between the
true marginal product of capital and the market return observed by ﬁrms when making their
investment decisions. The volatility of these shocks is calibrated to match a return volatility
statistic for the S&P 500 index, analogous to the procedure used here to calibrate the law of
motion for the bubble component of the equity price. He ﬁnds that optimal monetary policy
should lean against non-fundamental asset price movements. Hassan and Mertens (2011)
consider the welfare costs of excess volatility in a capitalist-worker model where the forecasts
of capital owners are perturbed away from the rational expectation by an exogenous shock,
similar to the model of Dupor (2005).
2 Historical Motivation
A reading of stock market history suggests that speculative bubbles are often linked to tech-
nological innovation. Shiller (2000) argues that major stock price run-ups have generally co-
incided with the emergence of some superﬁcially plausible “new era” theory that involves the
introduction of new technology. Figure 1 depicts four major run-ups in real U.S. stock prices.8
Shiller associates each run-up with the following technological advances that contributed to
new era enthusiasm:
• Early 1900s: High-speed rail travel, transatlantic radio, long-line electrical transmission.
• 1920s: Mass production of automobiles, travel by highways and roads, commercial radio
broadcasts, widespread electriﬁcation of manufacturing.
• 1950s and 60s: Widespread introduction of television, advent of the suburban lifestyle,
space travel.
• Late 1990s: Widespread availability of the internet, innovations in computers and infor-
mation technology, emergence of the web-based business model.
In comparing the late 1920s with the late 1990s, Gordon (2006) and White (2006) both
emphasize the simultaneous occurrence of major technological innovations, a productivity
8The series for real stock prices, real dividends, and real per capita consumption employed in the paper are
from Robert Shiller’s website www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/.
5revival, excess capital investment, and a stock market bubble fueled by speculation. Using data
on newly-issued patents, Nicholas (2008) argues that the 1920s was “a period of unprecedented
technological advance.” Schwert (1989, 2002) documents the pronounced increase in stock
market volatility that occurred during both periods, particularly in technology-related stocks
in the late 1990s. Cooper et al. (2001) document a pronounced “dotcom eﬀect” in the
late 1990s, whereby internet-related corporate name changes produced permanent abnormal
returns. The authors attribute their results to a form a speculative mania among investors for
“glamour” industries that are associated with new technology.
Much of the surge in business investment in the late 1990s was linked to computers and
information technology. During these years, measured productivity growth picked up, which
was often cited as evidence of a permanent structural change–one that portended faster
trend growth going forward.9 A recent analysis by Ireland and Schuh (2008) concludes that
the productivity revival of the 1990s was temporary rather than permanent. But at the time,
widespread belief in the so-called “new economy” caused investors to bid up stock prices to
unprecedented levels relative to dividends (Figure 2). The rise and fall of potential output
growth as measured by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) coincides roughly with the
rise and fall of cyclical movements in stock prices (Figure 3). The observed correlation be-
tween estimates of potential output growth and movements in the stock market motivates
consideration of a model where equity price bubbles can aﬀect the economy’s trend growth
rate.
Caballero et al. (2006) argue that rapidly rising stock prices in the late 1990s provided
ﬁrms with a low-cost source of funds from which to ﬁnance their investment projects. Figure 4
shows that the trajectory of the S&P 500 stock index, both before and after the bubble peak,
is strikingly similar to the trajectory of investment.
On January 13, 2000, near the peak of the stock market, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
discussed the possibility that productivity-enhancing innovations might have raised the U.S.
economy’s growth pace, but that investors might have overreacted to these developments:
“When we look back at the 1990s, from the perspective of say 2010...[w]e may
conceivably conclude from that vantage point that, at the turn of the millennium,
the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of inno-
vation, which propelled forward productivity, output, corporate proﬁts, and stock
prices at a pace not seen in generations, if ever. Alternatively, that 2010 retrospec-
tive might well conclude that a good deal of what we are currently experiencing
was just one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human
history. And, of course, we cannot rule out that we may look back and conclude
that elements from both scenarios have been in play in recent years.”
9For an optimistic assessment at the time, see Oliner and Sichel (2000). For a sceptical view, see Gordon
(2000).
6The model presented here incorporates “elements from both scenarios” described by Greenspan.
Figure 5 shows that one can observe similar comovement between asset prices and investment
in the recent U.S. housing market. Real house prices rose sharply from 2000 to 2006 while real
residential investment experienced an unprecedented boom. Both series then reversed course
dramatically. An accommodative interest rate environment, combined with a proliferation
of new mortgage products (loans with little or no down payment, minimal documentation of
income, and payments for interest-only or less), helped fuel the run-up in house prices. While
perhaps less obvious than with the late-1990s stock market bubble, one can make the case
that over-enthusiasm for new technology played a role in the mid-2000s housing market boom.
On April 8, 2005, near the peak of the housing bubble, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
oﬀered the following optimistic assessment of new technology:
“[T]he ﬁnancial services sector has been dramatically transformed by technol-
ogy... Information processing technology has enabled creditors to achieve signiﬁ-
cant eﬃciencies in collecting and assimilating the data necessary to evaluate risk
and make corresponding decisions about credit pricing. With these advances in
technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other tech-
niques for eﬃciently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers...Where
once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are
now able to quite eﬃciently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to
price that risk appropriately. These improvements have led to rapid growth in
subprime mortgage lending.”
The subprime lending boom was later followed by a sharp rise in delinquencies and fore-
closures, massive write-downs in the value of securities backed by subprime mortgages and
derivatives, the collapse of several large ﬁnancial institutions, and, ultimately, a serious ﬁnan-
cial crisis prompting unprecedented U.S. government intervention in private capital markets.
In retrospect, Greenspan’s enthusiasm for a “new era” in credit risk modeling appears a bit
overdone.
3M o d e l











subject to the budget constraint
 +  =     0 (2)
7where  is consumption,  is investment,  is output (or income),  is the subjective time
discount factor, and  is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution). When  =1  the within-period utility function can be written
as log() The symbol  represents the mathematical expectation operator.
Output is produced according to the technology
 = exp()
1−
   0 ∈ (01] (3)





 0 given, (4)
where  is the agent’s stock of physical capital and  represents a persistent, mean-reverting
technology shock. When 1 output is also aﬀected by , which represents the stock of
human capital or knowledge. Following Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), I assume that 
grows proportionally to, and as a by-product of, accumulated private investment activities.
This “learning-by-doing” formulation is captured by the speciﬁcation  = ,w h e r e is the
economy-wide average capital stock per person which the agent takes as given. In equilibrium,
all agents are identical, so we have  =  which is imposed after the investment decision is
made. When 1 the private marginal product of capital is less than the social marginal
product such that agents underinvest relative to the socially-optimal level.
Resources devoted to investment augment the stock of physical capital according to the
law of motion
+1 =  1−
 
   0 ∈ (01] 0 given, (5)
which reﬂects capital adjustment costs. This formulation has been employed previously by
Cassou and Lansing (2006) in a welfare analysis of tax reform. Equation (5) can be interpreted































where  and  are Taylor-series coeﬃcients and f  =e x p{ [log()]} is the approxima-
tion point.10














10Since the functional form of the constraint aﬀects the agent’s intertemporal optimality condition, the
economic environment considered here is not isomorphic to that of Jermann (1998) and Barlevy (2004).
8where +1 is known at time  The ﬁrst-order condition can be rearranged to obtain the















where  ≡  is the ex-dividend price of an equity share with claim to a perpetual stream
of dividends  =  − .W h e n  =1  consumption is equal to dividends, analogous to
the Lucas (1978 ) endowment economy. When 1 consumption strictly exceeds dividends,
owing to the presence of the learning-by-doing externality which can be viewed as separate
source of income for the agent. The term  (+1)
− is the stochastic discount factor.
The model’s adjustment cost speciﬁcation (5) implies a direct link between the equity
price  and investment  consistent with a standard Tobin’s  framework. This feature is
also consistent with the observed comovement between U.S. stock prices and business invest-
ment shown in Figure 4. Although the model implies perfect comovement between  and
 this prediction could be relaxed by introducing stochastic variation in the adjustment cost
parameter 11













which shows that return volatility is driven by the volatility of investment growth and by the
volatility of the output-investment ratio.
To facilitate a solution to the agent’s problem, the ﬁrst-order condition (8) must be rewrit-
ten in terms of stationary variables. If we deﬁne the price-consumption ratio as  ≡  =




























 − (1 − ) 
 (13)
11Lansing (2011) considers an adjustment cost speciﬁcation that allows for stochastic variation in the relative
contributions of new investment versus existing capital in the production of new capital goods.
9which is a non-linear function of the price-consumption ratio  When there is no productive
externality, we have  =1such that  = 
An expression for equilibrium consumption growth can be obtained by combining (10),


























exp[+1 − (1 − ) ] (14)
Substituting the above expression into the ﬁrst-order condition (8) together with +1 =
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The observed technology shock  and the existing capital stock  uniquely determine the
amount of per capita output according to (3). Each period, the agent must only decide the
fraction of available output to be devoted to investment, with the remaining fraction devoted
to consumption. The investment-consumption ratio is given by  =  Hence, the agent’s
decision problem can be formulated equivalently in terms of the price-consumption ratio 
which is a stationary variable.
3.1 Rational Solution
The transformed ﬁrst-order condition (15) is a non-linear stochastic diﬀerence equation. Ex-
cept for the special case of log utility ( =0 ) an exact analytical solution cannot be obtained.
To facilitate an approximate analytical solution, both sides of equation (15) are approximated










where 0 1 0 and 1 are Taylor-series coeﬃcients that depend on e ,a sd e ﬁned in Appendix
A. In equilibrium, movements in  are driven solely by movements in the technology shock
 The approximate rational solution is given by the following proposition.
10Proposition 1. An approximate analytical solution for the rational price-consumption ratio
is given by
 = e exp( )
where e  =e x p{ [log()]} is the approximation point and  is given by
 =
 [ − (1 − )]
1 − 1

Proof : See Appendix A.
In the special case of logarithmic utility, we have  =0such that  =0  resulting in
 = e  for all  From equation (13), the price-dividend ratio  is also constant in the
logarithmic case. When  6=0  the valuation ratios  and  respond to technology shocks.
The direction of movement depends on the relative magnitudes of the income and substitution
eﬀects of the shock, which in turn are governed by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS), as given by 1(1 − ).W h e n1 we have 0 such that EIS  1. The sign of
the technology response coeﬃcient  depends not only on the sign of , but also on the sign
of −(1 − )12 In the baseline calibration, the result is 0.W h e n0 the substitution
eﬀect of a positive technology shock dominates the income eﬀect such that investment increases
relative to consumption, thus causing the ratio  =( ) to rise. For moderate levels of
risk aversion,  and  exhibit very little volatility because the income and substitution
eﬀects of a technology shock largely oﬀset one another.
3.2 Near-Rational Bubble Law of Motion
The ﬁrst-order condition (8) imposes a no-arbitrage condition from period  to  +1  Since
equation (8) does not enforce a transversality condition, it admits solutions where the equity
price  can deviate from the rational solution implied by fundamentals alone. So-called “ra-
tional bubble” solutions have been proposed as a way to account for the empirical observation
that equity prices appear excessively volatile relative to a discounted stream of dividends or
cash ﬂows. The underlying assumption is that agents are forward-looking, but not to the
extreme degree implied by the transversality condition.13








 are the fundamental and bubble components of the equity price
which are directly proportional to the fundamental and bubble components of investment,
12For all calibrations examined, 1 − 1  0
13See Lansing (2010) for a review of the literature on rational bubbles and the numerous theoretical caveats
that govern their existence.
11denoted by f
 and b






































In equation (18), the fundamental component of the equity price f
 is equal to the expected
discounted value of next period’s payoﬀ amount +1+f
+1. In contrast to a Lucas (1978) type
model where consumption and dividends are exogenous, the bubble component here inﬂuences
both the stochastic discount factor  (+1)
− and the dividend +1 Hence, feedback from
the bubble component aﬀects the fundamental equity price, similar to the model of Weil
(1990). In equation (19), the bubble component of the equity price b
 is equal to the expected
discounted value of next period’s bubble price b
+1 with no regard for dividends. Hence, while
the bubble component of investment b
 augments the stock of physical capital via equation
(5), the shareholders who supply the investment funds to the capitalist-entrepreneur receive
no claim to any extra dividends; their expected return on the additional funds derives solely





 the no-arbitrage conditions (18) and (19) can be
written as
f


















where  ≡ 1− and have I substituted in +1 = +1+f
+1+b
+1. Equation (21) implies that
the bubble component of the price-consumption ratio b
 must grow over time in expectation
by a suﬃcient amount to oﬀset the discounting implied by the stochastic discount factor.
A rational bubble solution that satisﬁes (21) exactly would thus deliver the result that b

is non-stationary, ruling out the existence of a balanced growth path. Moreover, as shown
by Lansing (2010), there can be a continuum of rational bubble solutions that satisfy the
no-arbitrage condition, with solutions along the continuum exhibiting diﬀerent equilibrium
responses to fundamental state variables. The representative agent must postulate a solution
for b
 in order to evaluate the conditional expectation on the right side of the no-arbitrage
condition. For risk aversion coeﬃcients near unity, the no-arbitrage condition can be written
as b
 ' b
+1 which shows that the postulated solution can have a strong inﬂuence on the
12resulting no-arbitrage value. Depending on the functional form of the postulated solution, the
agent’s expectations may become self-fulﬁlling, allowing for multiple rational bubble solutions.
To sidestep the complications associated with rational bubbles, I postulate the following
stationary law of motion for the bubble component:
b
 = f
 [exp(b ) − 1] (22)
where b is a parameter that governs the response to observed technology shocks. The bub-
ble is “intrinsic” in the terminology of Froot and Obstfeld (1991) because the bubble law of
motion depends solely on fundamentals; there are no extraneous shocks or sunspot variables.
Consistent with the historical examples provided by Shiller (2000), equation (22) implies that
fundamental technology innovations are important to investors, but their eﬀects are ampliﬁed
whenever b  0. Under this formulation, a sequence of suﬃciently large technology innova-
tions can produce large excursions away from the fundamental equity price. Notice that for
any value of b the bubble law of motion satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition (21) exactly when
 = +1 =0 . Later, in the model simulations, I will show that the bubble law of motion is
“near-rational” in the sense that it approximately satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition for most
realizations of  and +1 Unlike a rational bubble solution, the near-rational law of motion
allows the equity price to occasionally dip below the equilibrium value implied by Proposition
1 for the bubble-free economy.
3.3 Fundamental Solution in the Bubble Economy
The expression for +1 in the bubble economy takes the same form as equation (14), but
now  = f
 + b
 Similarly, the form of equations (10) through (13) carry over to the bubble
economy. Substituting +1 from equation (14) into the fundamental no-arbitrage condition
(20) and then also substituting in  = f
+b
 with b
 given by the bubble law of motion (22)
yields the following equation that governs the evolution of the fundamental price-consumption
ratio f


























where  and e  are deﬁned as before. The above expression collapses to equation (15) when
b =0such that  = f

To facilitate an approximate analytical solution for f
 I proceed as before and approximate
both sides of equation (23) as power functions around the points e f =e x p {[log(f
)]} and


































2 are Taylor-series coeﬃcients that depend on e f and b as shown
in Appendix B. The approximate fundamental solution is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. An approximate analytical solution for the fundamental price-consumption
ratio in the bubble economy is given by
f
 = e f exp(f )
where e f =e x p {[log(f









Proof : See Appendix B.
Substituting the laws of motion for f
 and b
 into the deﬁnitional relationship  = f
+b

yields the following approximate expression for the total price-consumption ratio





which collapses to the rational solution from Proposition 1 when b =0or when  =0  The
above equation implies [log()] = [log(f
)] When b  0 the price-consumption ratio
“overreacts” to innovations in technology, thereby generating excess volatility.










 − (1 − ) 
 (26)
where  = f
 + b
 Due to the non-linear nature of the above equation, the presence of
excess volatility in  can generate sharp run-ups and crashes in the price-dividend ratio
which resemble patterns observed in long-run U.S. data.
4 Model Calibration
A time period in the model is taken to be one year. The technology response parameter b
in the bubble law of motion (22) is calibrated so that the bubble model matches the volatility
of the price-dividend ratio in long-run annual U.S. data. This method of calibrating b is
analogous to the manner in which the exogenous crash probability parameter might be chosen
in a particular class of rational bubble models.14 The remaining parameters of the model
14The procedure for calibrating 
b abstracts from the underlying source of excess volatility. Reduced-form
modeling devices such as this are often employed in macroeconomics. Examples include Calvo-type sticky price
models which abstract from the underlying source of price stickiness, or money-in-the-utility-function models
which abstract from the underlying role played by money in facilitating transactions.
14are chosen simultaneously to match various empirical targets, as summarized in Table 1. For
example, the volatility of the technology shock innovation  is chosen so that the model
matches the standard deviation of real per capita consumption growth in long-run annual
U.S. data. Appendix C contains the approximate analytical moments that are used as a
starting point to calibrate the nonlinear model.
The rational model employs the same parameter values as the bubble model, except that
b =0for the rational model. I examine a range of values for the externality parameter
 and the risk aversion coeﬃcient  Speciﬁcally, I consider  ∈ {04 06 10} and  ∈
{0510152025} T h eb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o ni s =0 4 and  =1 5 Whenever  or  is
changed, the remaining parameters are re-adjusted to maintain the same targets shown in
Table 1.
Given the calibrated values of  and  shown in Table 1, equation (6) can be used to
recover the implied curvature parameter 1 for comparison with Barlevy (2004). Assuming
an annual depreciation rate of  =0 1 equation (6) yields 1 =0 59 when  =0 4 and yields
1 =0 12 when  =1 0 Barlevy (2004) considers values in the range 012 ≤ 1 ≤ 026 for
an endogenous growth model that corresponds to the  =1 0 case. As 1 → 10 the implied
adjustment costs approach zero. Hence, the calibration methodology used here delivers lower
implied adjustment costs when 1
Table 1: Example Calibrations for the Bubble Model
Parameter Value Description/Empirical Target
 0.4 0.6 1.0 Capital share of income.
 1.5 1.5 1.5 Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
 0.333 0.333 0.333 Mean capital-output ratio = 3.
 0.071 0.030 0.014 Mean investment-output ratio = 0.25.
 1.217 1.100 1.056 Mean consumption growth = 2.03 %.
 0.054 0.072 0.086 Standard deviation of consumption growth = 3.51 %.
 0.9 0.9 0.9 Corr. ( −1−1) ' 09.
 0.968 0.969 0.970 Mean price-dividend ratio = 26.6.
b 2.305 2.410 2.560 Standard deviation of price-dividend ratio = 13.8.
When  =0 4 and  =1 5 the parameter values in Table 1 yield  =0 069 in the rational
model from Proposition 1 and f = −0752 in the bubble model from Proposition 2. The
presence of the bubble thus alters the nature of the fundamental solution. The small positive
value of  in the rational model implies that a favorable technology shock brings about a
small increase in the ratio  But in the bubble model, we have f + b =1 55 so that a
favorable technology shock brings about a large increase in the ratio  thereby magnifying
the volatility of the equity price relative to consumption and dividends. When a favorable
technology shock increases the bubble component of investment, less resources are available
for paying dividends which are given by  −  All else equal, a dividend cut pushes down
the fundamental component of the equity price and fundamental investment. The fact that
15f  0 shows that the fundamental investment response serves to partially undo the extra
investment induced by the bubble.
5 Near-Rational Bubble Dynamics
The top panel of Figure 6 checks the conformance of the bubble law of motion (22) with the
no-arbitrage condition (21) for the baseline calibration with  =0 4 and  =1 5. Other cali-
brations produced similar results. To construct the no-arbitrage value, I employ the following
power-function approximation for consumption growth that is derived in Appendix C:
+1







exp[+1 − (1 − ) ] (27)
where e f is the endogenous trend growth rate of consumption that depends on e f and b
and 1 and 2 are Taylor-series coeﬃcients. To evaluate the conditional expectation on the
right side of the no-arbitrage condition, I insert the approximate laws of motion for +1 and
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where I have also substituted in the postulated bubble law of motion for b
+1 from equation
(22). The second line of the equation groups terms that are known at time . Given the sto-
chastic process for +1 the conditional expectation of the above expression can be computed
analytically each period to provide a no-arbitrage value for b
 that satisﬁes equation (21) by
construction.
Similarly, the bottom panel of Figure 6, checks the conformance of the total price-consumption
ratio  with the following no-arbitrage condition implied by the ﬁrst-order condition (8):





[ + +1 (1 −  + )] (29)
To evaluate the conditional expectation on the right-side of the above expression, I again
make use of the consumption growth approximation (27) together with the approximate laws of
motion for +1 and  from equation (25). As before, the conditional expectation is computed
analytically each period to provide a no-arbitrage value for  that satisﬁes equation (29) by
construction.
16Figure 6 plots the constructed no-arbitrage values versus b
 and  from the calibrated
model. In both cases, there is close agreement between the two series except for extreme
realizations of the technology shock that correspond to extreme readings for b
 Recall that
the postulated bubble law of motion satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition exactly when  =
+1 =0  But even for moderate shock realizations, there is close agreement between the
two series showing that there is little opportunity for arbitrage. Intuitively, due to the self-
referential nature of the no-arbitrage conditions, the postulated law of motion for the bubble
component is close to self-fulﬁlling.
An AR(1) regression on data for b
 generated by the calibrated law of motion (22) yields
b
 =0 897b
−1 +0 002 Whereas the typical rational bubble solution yields non-stationary
behavior for the price-consumption ratio, the near-rational bubble considered here is stationary
but highly persistent.
A natural question to ask is whether the postulated bubble law of motion (22) is learnable.
Similar to the near-rational bubble solution presented in Lansing (2010), equation (22) is
underparameterized relative to a rational bubble solution that would satisfy the no-arbitrage
condition (21) exactly. Given data on  f
 and  the agent could estimate the technology













where  = f
 + b
 In a typical real-time learning algorithm, the most-recent estimate of
b would be allowed to inﬂuence the evolution of f
 and b
 by solving (20) and (21) each
period, where the agent’s conditional forecasts would be computed using the postulated law of
motion, as in equation (28) above. The agent’s estimate of b w o u l dt h e nb eu p d a t e da n dt h e
simulation continued until some sort of convergence criteria is achieved.15 As an approximation
to such an algorithm, I generate data for f
 and b
 under the baseline calibration with  =0 4
and  =1 5 The data is generated by jointly solving the no-arbitrage conditions (20) and
(21), with b =2 305 (the postulated value). The agent’s conditional forecasts are computed
using the postulated law of motion (22). Using this data, the estimated technology response
parameter from equation (30) is b =2 1 w h i c hi sr e a s o n a b l yc l o s et ot h ep o s t u l a t e dv a l u e
used to generate the data. From the agent’s perspective, sampling variation in the covariance
between log( f
 ) and  could account for the deviation between the estimated value and
the postulated value. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for other calibrations. Hence,
to a ﬁrst approximation , the postulated law of motion for the bubble is consistent with data
generated by an actual law of motion.
15For examples of real-time learning algorithms along these lines, see Lansing (2009, section 4.1) and Lansing
(2010, section 4.3).
176M o d e l S i m u l a t i o n s
This section demonstrates the ability of the bubble model to match various features of long-run
U.S. data.
Table 2 presents unconditional moments computed from long simulations, where 
+1 ≡
log(+1) and 
+1 ≡ log(+1) are the growth rates of dividends and consumption,
respectively. The table also reports the corresponding statistics from long-run U.S. data.16






Mean  26.6 23.0 26.5
Std. Dev. 13.8 0.38 13.8
Skew. 2.20 0.03 4.23
Kurt. 8.21 2.94 44.3
Corr. Lag 1 0.93 0.90 0.84
Mean +1 7.84 % 6.66 % 7.27 %
Std. Dev. 17.8 % 6.06 % 12.1 %
Corr. Lag 1 004 −004 −006
Mean 
+1 1.37 % 2.03 % 2.04 %
Std. Dev. 11.7 % 4.96 % 8.25 %
Corr. Lag 1 0.13 −003 −003
Mean 
+1 2.03 % 2.03 % 2.04 %
Std. Dev. 3.51 % 5.33 % 3.51 %
Corr. Lag 1 −007 −003 0.21
Note: Model statistics are from a 15,000 period simulation with  =0 4=1 5
Recall that the bubble model is calibrated to match the mean and volatility of the price-
dividend ratio in the data. But the model also does a reasonably good job of matching other
asset pricing moments. In particular, the U.S. price-dividend ratio exhibits positive skewness
and excess kurtosis, which suggest the presence of nonlinearities in the data. The bubble
model is able to capture these features because excess volatility in  together with the non-
linear form of equations (22), (23), and (26), produces intermittent run-ups and crashes in
the price-dividend ratio. In contrast, the rational model delivers very low volatility, near-zero
skewness, and no excess kurtosis. The persistence of the price-dividend ratio in both models
is inherited from the persistent technology shock process with  =0 9.
The mean equity return for both models is just slightly below the long-run U.S. average of
7.84%. The volatility of returns in the bubble model is about twice that of the rational model
(12.1% versus 6.06%), but somewhat below the return volatility of 17.8% in the data. Equation
16The sample periods for the U.S. data shown in Table 3 are as follows: price-dividend ratio 1871-2008, real
equity return 1871-2008, real dividend growth 1872-2008, real per capita consumption growth 1890-2008. The
price-dividend ratio in year  is deﬁned as the value of the S&P 500 stock index at the beginning of year  +1 
divided by the accumulated dividend over year 
18(9) shows how excess volatility in investment contributes directly to excess volatility in the
equity return. The reason the bubble model underpredicts the U.S. return volatility is because
it underpredicts the volatility of dividend growth, which is one component of the return. The
volatility of dividend growth in the bubble model is 8.25% whereas the corresponding ﬁgure in
U.S. data is 11.7%. From equation (12), the volatility of dividend growth could be increased by
introducing stochastic variation in either the production function parameter  or the capital
adjustment cost parameter 
The bubble model is calibrated to match the ﬁrst and second moments of per capita con-
sumption growth in the data. Consumption growth in the bubble model exhibits small positive
serial correlation, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.21, whereas the correlation coeﬃcient in
the data is slightly negative at −007 In post-World War II U.S. consumption data, however,
the correlation coeﬃcient is around 0.20.
Figure 7 plots simulations from both models for the baseline calibration with  =0 4 and
 =1 5 In the top left panel, the highly persistent and volatile nature of the price-dividend
ratio in the bubble model gives rise to intermittent excursions away from the rational model
value. The behavior of the model price-dividend ratio looks qualitatively similar to the U.S.
data shown earlier in Figure 2. With b  0 the bubble component of the equity price
increases in response to a positive technology shock, as does the total price-dividend ratio
because f + b  0. The technology-driven bubble episodes in the model coincide with
economic booms and excess capital formation, as shown in the lower panels of Figure 7.
Interestingly, the bubble model can also generate prolonged periods where the price-dividend
ratio remains in close proximity to the rational value. This is because the bubble component
remains close to zero so long as technology shocks remain small. Consequently, only a fraction
of the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the model are due to bubble-like episodes.
Table 3 compares the volatilities of the model growth rates to those in the data.17 In the
rational model, the presence of capital adjustment costs makes the volatility of investment
growth about the same as the volatility of output growth, which is counterfactual. In long-
run U.S. data, investment growth is about three times more volatile than output growth. By
construction, the bubble model magniﬁes equity price volatility which is linked directly to
the volatility of investment growth. Given that output growth volatility in the two models
is about the same, the excess volatility of investment growth in the bubble model results in
a lower volatility of consumption growth relative to the rational benchmark. This result has
implications for the welfare analysis, which is discussed in the next section.
Figure 8 plots annual growth rates of macroeconomic variables from model simulations.
The excess volatility of investment growth in the bubble model not only magniﬁes the volatility
of dividend growth (bringing it closer to the data) but it also changes the cyclical pattern of
17Data on per capita real GDP from 1870-2008 was obtained from www.globalﬁnancialdata.com.D a t ao n
real business ﬁxed investment from 1929-2008 was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver
Analytics.
19dividend growth relative to the rational model. This is because an increase in the bubble
component of investment absorbs resources that could otherwise be paid out as dividends.








∆log() 1871-2008 5.28 542 545
∆log() 1890-2008 3.51 533 351
∆log() 1872-2008 11.7 496 825
∆log() 1930-2008 16.2 571 118
∆log() 1872-2008 17.9 571 118
Note: In percent, from 15,000 period simulation with  =0 4=1 5
7W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
This section examines the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations that can be attributed to either: (i)
speculative bubbles, or (ii) business cycles. Details of the welfare computations are contained
in Appendix E. Expected lifetime utility in each economy is approximated by the average
over 5000 simulations, each 2500 periods in length, after which the results are not changed.
Welfare costs are measured by the percentage change in per-period consumption that makes the
agent indiﬀerent between the two economies being compared. Given annual U.S. consumption
expenditures of around $10 trillion in 2009, a one percent change in per-period consumption
translates into an aggregate welfare cost of $100 billion per year, which is equivalent to an
annual cost of $855 per household, based on an estimate of about 117 million U.S. households
in 2009.18
The basic intuition underlying the welfare results is as follows:
• Bubbles direct more resources to investment on average which can help address the
economy’s underinvestment problem when 1.
• However, when  =1  bubbles cause over-investment and under-consumption on average.
• Bubbles raise the volatility of investment, which leads to ineﬃciency in the production
of new capital due to convex adjustment costs.
• As a mitigating factor, excess volatility in investment implies lower volatility in con-
sumption growth relative to the rational model.
Which of these various eﬀects dominate depends crucially on parameter values. It turns
out that bubbles can be welfare-improving when risk aversion is low and the underinvestment
18Data on aggregate U.S. consumption and the number of U.S. households are from Haver Analytics.
20problem is severe. Table 4 summarizes some moments that inﬂuence the welfare computa-
tion.19 For each value of the risk coeﬃcient , the bubble model is calibrated to match the
mean and volatility of per capita consumption growth in long-run U.S. data. The rational
model uses the same parameter values as the bubble model. The deterministic model sets
 =0for all  such that the  ratio and the growth rate of consumption are both constant
at their deterministic steady-state values. As described in Appendix E, the initial level of
consumption in the deterministic model diﬀers from the average initial consumption levels in
the ﬂuctuating models.
Table 4 shows that the mean  ratio is highest in the bubble model. This result follows










 0 i.e., the
bubble-component of investment is positive on average. Since the bubble model directs more
resources to investment on average, it helps to address the economy’s underinvestment problem
whenever 1.B u tw h e n =1  the bubble model is characterized by overinvestment which
serves to reduce welfare.
The bubble model is also characterized by higher volatility of the  ratio, which leads
to ineﬃciency in the production of new capital due to the convex adjustment costs embedded
in the capital law of motion (5). Figure 9 plots the model relationship between gross capital
growth +1 and the investment-capital ratio  The upward-sloping dashed straight line
(in red) is the hypothetical relationship implied by a linear law of motion with no adjustment
costs and a constant annual depreciation rate, i.e., +1 =1−  + . The hypothetical
constant depreciation rate is computed from the bubble model simulations as  =1 +  ()−
 (+1)=0 064 The vertical intercept of the hypothetical relationship is 1− Comparing
the slope of the straight line (equal to 1.0) to the slope of the model relationship (equal to
0.845) shows that capital adjustment costs are relatively small on average, i.e., when  =
 ()=0 086 The ﬁgure also depicts ±1 standard deviation bands around the mean 
ratio from the simulations. The slope of the model relationship can vary between 0.64 and
1.23 as the  ratio varies above or below its mean value by one standard deviation.
Since the capital law of motion implies +1 =  ()
  a mean-preserving increase
in the volatility of  will lower the mean growth rate of the capital stock +1 which
in turn inﬂuences the mean growth rate of consumption. Excess volatility in the ratio 
thus tends to waste resources that could otherwise be used to support capital formation and
growth. But as a mitigating factor, the bubble model lowers the volatility of consumption
growth relative to the rational model, as noted earlier in the description of Table 3. When
risk aversion is low and the underinvestment problem is severe, the positive welfare impacts
from bubbles outweigh the negative impacts, but the reverse holds true for higher levels of
risk aversion or when the underinvestment problem is less severe.
19The model statistics for 

+1 s h o w ni nT a b l e4d i ﬀer slightly from those shown earlier in Tables 2 and
3 because the Table 4 statistics are averaged over 5000 simulations as part of the welfare computation, as
described in Appendix E.



































































Note: In percent, averaged over 5000 simulations of 2500 periods each.
Table 5 summarizes the welfare cost of speculative bubbles relative to the rational model
with identical parameter values. The table shows that bubbles can improve welfare if risk
aversion is very low ( =0 5) and the underinvestment problem is severe ( =0 4).H i g h e r
levels of risk aversion cause the welfare cost of bubbles to increase rapidly when  =0 4,
but the welfare costs decline a bit with risk aversion when  =1  When  =1  there is no
underinvestment problem in the economy. In this case, the bubble model’s higher mean value
of  represents a misallocation of resources. The bubble model’s excess volatility in 
continues to waste resources via the convex capital adjustment costs. These negative welfare
impacts must be weighed against the rational model’s higher consumption growth volatility,
with the latter taking on greater signiﬁcance for welfare at higher degrees of risk aversion.
Consequently, as risk aversion rises with  =1 , the welfare cost of bubbles relative to the
rational model exhibits a declining tendency over the range 05 ≤  ≤ 25.
Table 5: Welfare Cost of Speculative Bubbles
 =0 4  =0 6  =1 0
0.5 −093 107 327
1.0 041 168 274
1.5 132 215 242
2.0 206 257 223
2.5 275 298 213
Note: In percent of per-period consumption.
The results in Table 5 reﬂect a complex combination of eﬀects that involve shifts in the
endogenous trend growth rate of consumption, shifts in the volatility of consumption growth,
and shifts in the level of consumption (as reﬂected in average initial consumption and the mean
 r a t i o ) . I na ne ﬀort to gauge the magnitude of the eﬀects coming from the endogenous
22growth feature, I replace  =  in the production function (3) with the speciﬁcation  =
0 exp() where  =0 0203 is an exogenous trend growth rate imposed on both the rational
and bubble versions of the model. For simplicity, I employ the same decision rules for  as in
the original versions of each model.20 For the baseline calibration with  =0 4 and  =1 5
the welfare cost of speculative bubbles under exogenous growth is 0.30 percent–less than
one-fourth of the 1.32 percent cost obtained under endogenous growth. This result is not
surprising; it is well-known since Lucas (1987) that the welfare cost of cyclical ﬂuctuations in
standard models is generally small in the absence of long-run growth eﬀects. Notwithstanding
this result, the U.S. data plotted in Figure 3 supports the notion that bubbles can inﬂuence
trend growth, as captured by the original model.
Table 6 summarizes the welfare cost of business cycles in the bubble model relative to a
deterministic model with identical parameter values. I focus on the welfare cost of business
cycles in the bubble model (as opposed to the rational model) because, by construction, the
bubble model matches the empirical targets listed in Table 1, and hence is a more realistic
representation of the U.S. economy for the chosen parameter values. The welfare comparison
between the bubble model and the deterministic model shown in Table 6 can be interpreted
as a more extreme experiment in the eﬀects removing ﬂuctuations relative to that shown in
Table 5. As before, the welfare costs increase rapidly with risk aversion when  =0 4 Now
however, the welfare costs are also increasing with risk aversion when  =1  in contrast to the
pattern in Table 5. In this case, the bubble model is being compared to an alternative where
consumption growth is constant, whereas in Table 5, the bubble model is being compared to
an alternative where consumption growth is more volatile.
Referring back to Table 4, when  =0 5 and  =0 4 the deterministic model exhibits
al o w e rm e a n ratio than the bubble model (8.33% versus 8.63%)–a feature that is
particularly costly when  =0 4 Business cycles (which include intermittent bubble episodes)
serve to direct more resources to investment on average and thereby help to address the
underinvestment problem. For this reason, and because risk aversion is low, business cycle
ﬂuctuations in the bubble model serve to increase welfare by 2.42%. But as risk aversion
increases, the agent increasingly dislikes consumption growth volatility and the negative eﬀects
of ﬂuctuations dominate the positive eﬀects, producing large welfare losses.
20The re-optimized decision rules for  would depend not only on the technology shock  but also on the
normalized capital stock, deﬁned as exp()
23Table 6: Welfare Cost of Business Cycles in Bubble Model
 =0 4  =0 6  =1 0
0.5 −242 −001 216
1.0 042 168 275
1.5 228 311 346
2.0 375 441 424
2.5 502 565 509
Note: In percent of per-period consumption.
Overall, the main message from the welfare analysis is that technology-driven bubbles and
the associated business cycle ﬂuctuations can be very costly for typical parameter settings.
When the risk aversion coeﬃcient is  =1 5 the welfare costs in Tables 5 and 6 range from a
low of 1.32% to a high 3.46%.
Barlevy (2004) estimates that eliminating business cycles can yield welfare gains of around
7 percent of per-period consumption in an endogenous growth model with logarithmic utility
( =1 )and no productive externality ( =1 ) Barlevy’s rational model is calibrated to match
post-World War II data, whereas the bubble model considered here is calibrated to match
long-run data prior to the year 1900. Interestingly, the welfare costs of business cycles in
the bubble model with  =1are not too far from Barlevy’s results, despite diﬀerences in
the capital adjustment cost formulation and the calibration methodology. Qualitatively, the
results presented in Table 6 are consistent with Barlevy’s ﬁnding that the welfare cost of
business cycles can be large when ﬂuctuations inﬂuence trend growth.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
“Nowhere does history indulge in repetitions so often or so uniformly as in Wall Street,”
observed legendary speculator Jesse Livermore way back in the year 1923.21 History has
proven him right. The dramatic run-up and crash of the U.S. stock market in the late 1920s was
followed decades later by twin bubbles and crashes in Japanese real estate and stocks during
the late 1980s and early 1990s. These episodes were later followed by the U.S. technology
stock mania of the late 1990s, which ended abruptly in March 2000. Most recently, a global
housing bubble during the mid-2000s nearly brought down the world’s ﬁnancial system when,
like all preceding bubbles, it ultimately burst.
History tells us that periods of major technological innovation are often accompanied by
speculative bubbles. Excessive run-ups in asset prices can have important consequences for the
economy because mispriced assets imply a shift in resources relative to a bubble-free economy.
Innovations to technology are also considered by many economists to be an important driving
force for ordinary business cycles.
21From Livermore’s thinly-disguised biography by E. Lefevére (1923, p. 180).
24This paper developed a real business cycle model in which a bubble component in the
equity price generates excess volatility in response to observed technology shocks. The setup
can be described as “near-rational” because the bubble law of motion approximately satisﬁes a
period-by-period no-arbitrage condition. The bubble model outperformed the rational model
in capturing several features of long-run U.S. data, including the moments of asset pricing
variables and the relative volatilities of output, investment, and consumption growth rates.
Interestingly, even from the narrow perspective of this simple theoretical model, it remains
an open question whether the costs of speculative bubbles outweigh the possible beneﬁts to
society. According to the model, risk aversion must be low and the underinvestment problem
must be severe for bubbles to be welfare-improving. But for typical parameter settings, the
model showed that the welfare cost of bubbles is large.
It should be noted, of course, that the model abstracts from numerous real-world issues
that would aﬀect investors’ welfare. One noteworthy example is ﬁnancial fraud. Throughout
history, speculative bubbles have usually coincided with outbreaks of fraud and scandal, fol-
lowed by calls for more government regulation once the bubble has burst.22 Recent bubble
episodes are no diﬀerent.
22For a comprehensive historical review, see Gerding (2006).
25A Appendix: Rational Solution
This appendix provides the proof of Proposition 1. Taking logarithms of both sides of the
transformed ﬁrst-order condition (15) and then applying a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approxi-
mation to each side yields equation (16). The Taylor-series coeﬃcients are given by
0 =
e 1−
(1 + e )
(1−) (A.1)
1 =1 −
(1 + e )
1+e 
 (A.2)
0 = e 
"
 + e  (1 −  + )





e  (1 −  + )











The conjectured form of the rational solution +1 = e exp( +1) is substituted into the
right-side of (16). After evaluating the conditional expectation and then collecting terms, we
have:
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which shows that the conjectured form is correct. Solving for the undetermined coeﬃcient 
yields
 =
 [ − (1 − )]
1 − 1
 (A.6)
where 1 and 1 both depend on e  from (A.2) and (A.4).
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Comparing (A.8) to equation (14) shows that e  represents the endogenous trend growth rate
of consumption in the rational model. Given a set of parameter values, equations (A.7) and
(A.8) are solved simultaneously for e  and e  Equation (A.6) is then used to compute  ¥
26B Appendix: Fundamental Solution in Bubble Economy
This appendix provides the proof of Proposition 2. Taking logarithms of both sides of the
transformed ﬁrst-order condition (23) and then applying a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approxi-





the same form as equations (A.1) through (A.4), but e  is now replaced by e f since e b =0 .
The Taylor-series coeﬃcients f
2 and f
2 are given by
f
2 = (1 −  − b) −






1+e f(1 − b)
¤
1+e f −
(1 − )e fb
 + e f (1 −  + )
 (B.2)
where e f =e x p {[log(f
)]} =e x p {[log()]} is the approximation point. Notice that the




The conjectured form of the fundamental solution f
+1 = e f exp(f +1) is substituted
into the right-side of (24). After evaluating the conditional expectation and then collecting
terms, we have:
f

































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
 (B.3)







































In the above equation, e f represents the endogenous trend growth rate of consumption in the
bubble economy. Given a set of parameter values and a value for b, equations (B.5) and
(B.6) are solved simultaneously for e f and e f Equation (B.4) is then used to compute f ¥
27C Appendix: Approximate Moments for Calibration
Starting from equation (26), a Taylor series approximation for the total price-dividend ratio















 − (1 − )e f  1 =

 − (1 − )e f 
and e f =e x p {[log(f
)]} =e x p {[log()]} with e b =0 . The above expression implies the
following unconditional moments:
 [log()] = log(0) (C.2)
 [log()] = (1)
2  [log()]
=( 1)
2 (f + b)2  () (C.3)
[log() log(−1−1)] = [log() log(−1)]
= [ −1]
=  (C.4)
Given equations (C.2) and (C.3), the unconditional mean and variance of  can be com-
puted by making use of the properties of the log-normal distribution.23
Starting from equation (14) which carries over to the bubble economy with  = f
 + b
,
a Taylor-series approximation for consumption growth is given by
+1







exp[+1 − (1 − ) ] (C.5)
where 1 =
−e f
1+e f  2 =
(1 + e f)
1+e f 
and exp(e f) is given by equation (B.6). Given the solution for  in equation (25), the above







2(f + b) − 1+
i
 (C.6)
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 () (C.8)








2 {exp( [log()]) − 1}
28In the nonlinear model simulations (described below in Appendix D), the moments of
the price-dividend ratio and consumption growth in the bubble model can diﬀer from those
predicted by the approximate moment formulas, depending on the calibration. A process of
trial and error is used to select the parameter values used for the nonlinear model simulations.
The parameter values implied by the approximate moment formulas provide a good starting
point for the trial and error calibration process.
D Appendix: Model Simulations































where  is governed by the stochastic process (4). Equation (D.1) is the fundamental no-
arbitrage condition (23) where the right side shows the agent’s conditional forecast computed
using the power function approximation from (24) together with the approximate fundamental
solution from Proposition 2. Given the conditional forecast and the current observed value
of  the left side of (D.1) is solved for f
 each period using a nonlinear equation solver.
Given f
 and  the bubble law of motion (D.2) is used to compute b
 w h i c hi nt u r ng i v e s
from (D.3). Given  equations (10) through (12) are used to compute the allocations in the
bubble model where output is given by  = exp() The capital stock evolves according
to equation (5).
The initial condition in the simulations is the deterministic steady state which is the same
for both the bubble model and the rational model. The steady-state price-consumption ratio
is denoted by  Steady-state consumption growth is denoted by .T h e v a l u e s o f  and 
solve the following system of nonlinear equations
 =
exp()








E Appendix: Welfare Cost Computation
This appendix describes the procedure for computing the welfare costs presented in Tables 5,
6, and 7.
E.1 Welfare Cost of Speculative Bubbles










 ≡ 1 −  (E.1)
29where  =1 2 for the rational model and the bubble model, respectively. From equation
(10) we have  = (1 +  ) where  is computed using the nonlinear algorithm
described in Appendix D. The unconditional mean  is approximated by the average over
5000 simulations, each 2500 periods in length, after which the results are not changed. The
initial consumption levels at  =0are stochastic variables. Each simulation starts at  = −1
with  =1  such that  =1 (1 + ) where  is the steady-state price-consumption
ratio from equation (D.7). Note that the rational model and the bubble model share the same
steady state.
The welfare cost of speculative bubbles is the constant percentage amount by which 2
must be increased in the bubble model in order to make average lifetime utility equal to that






















which yields the result
 =
∙
(1 − )1 +1




In the case of log utility ( =0 ) equation (E.3) becomes  =e x p[ ( 1 − 2)(1− )] − 1
E.2 Welfare Cost of Business Cycles
Lifetime utility in the deterministic model is computed from equation (E.1) with  =0and
is denoted by 0 The welfare cost of business cycles in the bubble model is the constant
percentage amount by which 2 must be increased in order to make 2 equal to 0.T h e
deterministic simulation starts at  = −1 with 0 =1  such that 0 =1 (1 + ) where 
is given by equation (D.4). Deterministic consumption evolves according to the law of motion
0 = 0−1 exp() where  is given by equation (D.5). Deterministic consumption at  =0
will thus diﬀer from average consumption at  =0in the ﬂuctuating models.




(1 − )0 +1




In the case of log utility, ( =0 ) equation (E.4) becomes  =e x p[ ( 0 − 2)(1− )] − 1
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Figure 5: Comovement of residential investment and house prices.
Figure 6: Bubble law of motion approximately satisﬁes the no-arbitrage condition.
36Figure 7: Bubbles coincide with economic booms and excess capital formation.
37Figure 8: Bubbles magnify investment volatility but reduce consumption volatility.
38Figure 9: Slope of model relationship declines as  ratio rises above mean value.
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